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Summary 
Cost-benefit analyses require comparing costs and benefits that occur at different points 
in time. Doing so, however, creates conflicts between short-term considerations — a 
discounting scheme has to be consistent with observed behaviours — and long-term 
ethical issues — a discounting scheme must not favour the current generation over 
future ones. To overcome this conflict, the present article proposes a prescriptive 
consumption discounting scheme that applies different discount rates (i) for various 
incomes in the lifetime of a unique individual and (ii) for various incomes that affect 
different individuals. Practically, any income flux is first discounted to the birth date of 
all individuals using a discount rate with a non-zero pure preference for the present; 
then these individual discounted values are discounted to the present with a discount 
rate with no preference for the present and finally summed up. The aim of this 
prescriptive discount rate is to be consistent with observed individual behaviour 
(descriptive discount rate) without favouring current generations. Consequences are 
discussed and compared with the UK Green Book and the Stern Review discounting 
schemes. 
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Cost-beneﬁt analyses often require comparing costs and beneﬁts that
occur at diﬀerent points in time. This comparison is done using a
discount rate, which reﬂects the fact that beneﬁts and costs that occur
earlier are valued more than remote ones. This diﬀerence in valuation
is observed in money markets.
For social projects, e.g. climate change mitigation, however, the
use of market interest rate as discount rate is heatedly questioned (see
a review in Toth, 2000). In the UK, for instance, the “Green Book,
Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government”
(http://greenbook.treasury.gov.uk/) proposes several consumption dis-
count rates that depend on the considered time horizon (see Tab. 1).
The decreasing value of the discount rate is justiﬁed by the uncertainty
on future consumption (see Weitzman, 2001; Gollier, 2002).
In the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (Stern,
2006), the discount rate — averaged over the 1000 simulations that
were carried out — was very low, at 1.4 percent. This low value, which
was criticized by Maddison (2006) and Weitzman (2007), was justiﬁed
by the ethical position that the welfare of future generation should not
be valued lower than the welfare of current generation. In that sense,
the discount rate cannot be the same in a situation where only one
generation is aﬀected and in a situation where several generations are
aﬀected: one generation can value lower its own welfare in the future,
but can hardly justify valuing lower the welfare of another generation.
2 The discount rate
In a prescriptive framework, assuming a baseline scenario where real
consumption is growing at a ﬁxed rate2, the consumption discount
rate3 is given by the following relationship (Ramsey, 1928):
δ = ρ + n · g, (1)
2Note that the consequences of the project under consideration should not be large
enough to lead to a change in growth rate. In other terms, this relationship can be applied
only to projects with no inﬂuence at the macro level (Heal, 2005).
3This discount rate is referred to as “consumption discount rate” because it is applied
to a ﬂux of consumption not to a utility ﬂux.
2Period of the years 0-30 31-75 76-125 126-200 201-300 301+
Discount rate 3.5% 3.0% 2.5% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0%
Table 1: Discount rate of the Green Book, as a function of time.
where δ is the consumption discount rate; ρ is the pure preference for
the present; g is the growth rate of real consumption per capita; n is
the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, i.e. the change
in marginal utility of consumption when consumption increases by 1
percent.
The parameters n et g represent the fact that one euros will provide
less utility in the future, because consumers will be richer then, and
one euros will represent a smaller fraction of their income. These pa-
rameters are used to translate changes in monetary values into changes
in welfare levels. The Stern Review assumes that n=1 and g=1.3 per-
cent, while the Green Book assumes n=1 and g=2 percent. Weitzman
(2007) proposes to use n=2 and g=2. These diﬀerences show that
there is little agreement on the numerical values of these parameters.
The parameter ρ represents the fact that individuals value lower
their welfare in the future than their present welfare. It represents,
therefore, their impatience. This parameter is used to compare welfare
levels, not monetary values. Over the short-term, observations suggest
values ranging from 1 to 3 percent. The application of these rates to
long term issues, however, leads to ethical problems, since it means
that the welfare of future generations is less important than the welfare
of current generations.
For this reason, the Stern Review decided to use a value of ρ at 0.1
percent, assumed to be the annual probability of catastrophe eliminat-
ing society. Here, the only reason why welfare of future generations is
valued lower is the possibility that these future generations may not
exist. The prescriptive discount rate proposed in the Stern Review,
however, contradicts individual behaviours and descriptive discount
rates (see, e.g., Weitzman, 2007).
As a consequence, we are looking for a discounting scheme that
takes into account the facts that (i) we observe that individuals use
a non-zero pure preference for the present in their every-day choices
(ρ>0); and (ii) there is no reason to apply a pure preference for the
3present to future generations. This article proposes a scheme to do
so. To focus on the main point of the paper, we assume that there
is no uncertainty on future consumption — making the Green Book
argument for a decreasing discount rate irrelevant — and that there
is no risk of catastrophe threatening mankind.
3 A new scheme to discount over the
long term
The prescriptive discounting scheme proposed in this paper, hereafter
referred to as the intergenerational discount rate, considers a given,
certain ﬂux of income, with an income C(i)e a c hy e a ri.I t a i m s a t
assessing the net present value of this ﬂux. This discount rate is,
therefore, a consumption discount rate, not an utility discount rate,
which discounts utility levels.
In the scheme proposed here, as suggested by Hunt and Taylor
(2008), we do not discount current-generation consequences at the
same rate as intergenerational consequences. To do so, we consider
each individual separately. The ﬂux of income that each individual
will receive is ﬁrst discounted to the birth date of this individual.
This discounting is done using the usual discount rate, which takes
into account a non-zero pure preference for the present and the eﬀect
of economic growth and is consistent with observed behaviours.
Then, these discounted values are discounted to the present and
summed up. Since this second discounting phase considers diﬀerent
individuals, born at diﬀerent times, there is no reason to consider a
non-zero pure preference for the present (especially because we disre-
gard the risk that mankind may disappear). This second discounting
is done, therefore, using a discount rate that takes into account only
the eﬀect of real-consumption growth.
We consider a population P(i). Each year i,t h e r ea r ep(i)n e w
births, and each individual lives N years. We assume that the ﬂux of
income C(i) is distributed homogenously among the individuals. Each
individual has a ﬂux of income c(i)=C(i)/P(i).
We consider one individual, born during the year i>0. The net
value of his or her ﬂux of income at his or her birth date is given by
4r(i), the discounted sum of income ﬂuxes along his or her lifetime,
with a discount rate that takes into account both the pure preference










where j =1 ,...,n represents the age of the individual. Now, this
net value can be discounted to the present. Since this discounting
is done to a date that is before the birth of the individual, this dis-
counting does not have to take into account the pure preference for
the present, which would favour the current generation over the next
ones. But it does have to take into account the fact that future gener-
ations will be richer than the current one. To do so, we calculate the













This relationship is valid for individuals that will be born in the
year i>0. For individuals who are born in the past, during the year










For instance, an individual born 30 years before present (i = −30










If we sum the net present value of individuals who are born already
and of individuals who will be born in the future, we get the net present
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 j  (6)
5The ﬁrst sum is for the population that is already living at t=0;
the second sum is for the future population.
4 Example in a simpliﬁed case
To assess the consequences of using such a discounting scheme, we
consider here a simpliﬁed example. We assume that the population is
stable (P(i)=P), i.e. that there are as many deaths as births, so that








Then, we calculate the net present value of a ﬂux of income that is
constituted of one euro, received at the date k, and distributed evenly
among the population: Ck(j)=δjk and ck(j)=δjk/P. The net
present value of this ﬂux of income is given by Eq.(5).
If k ≥ N, nobody in the current population is aﬀected. The net













If k<N , some individuals in the current population will be af-





















These relationships can be simpliﬁed into:
Rk =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




































is the classical discounting scheme, with
pure preference for the present and the eﬀect of real-consumption
6growth. The second factor takes into account the fact that there is
no reason to use a preference for the present when we consider future
generations. When k is close to 0, Rk is close to the net present value
calculated with the usual discount rate (ρ + ng).


















So, when k is larger than N, the net present value of the unit of
income is proportional — but not equal — to the net present value
using the discount rate (1 + ng). It means that we do not include
impatience (or preference for the present) when we compare incomes
that will occur when the present generation is dead. Nevertheless,
impatience plays a role when we compare income that occurs after
the death of the present generation with income that occurs when the
current generation is — at least partly — alive.
From Rk, one can derive an equivalent discount rate, the intergen-
erational discount rate, i.e. the discount rate that, if applied between
the present and the year k, would make one euros in k years have a








Of course, δk varies with k:
￿ When k is close to zero, δk is close to (ρ + ng), i.e. a discount
rate that includes both pure preference for the present and the
eﬀect of real-consumption growth.
￿ When k tends to inﬁnity, this discount rate tends to (1+ng), i.e.
to a discount rate with no impatience. It means that when we
compare current income and income at the inﬁnity, we do not
apply any pure preference for the present.
This scheme, therefore, makes a transition between the observed
short-term discount rate, usually high, and an ethically acceptable
long-term discount rate, signiﬁcantly lower. This transition is not jus-
tiﬁed by uncertainty, like in the UK Green Book, but by a fundamental
diﬀerence between individual discounting and intergenerational dis-
counting.






































































Figure 1: Intergenerational discount rate as a function of time, from 0 to 100
years on the left and from 0 to 1000 years on the right. Parameters for the
intergenerational discount rate are those of the Stern Review for n and g,
but the pure preference for the present is assumed equal to 1.5 percent.
5 Numerical application
In this numerical exercise, we will use the values from the Stern Review
and from the UK Green Book. In both frameworks, n is assumed equal
to 1, while g is equal to 1.3 percent in the Stern Review and 2 percent
in the Green Book. In the Stern Review, the pure preference for the
present is ρ =0 .1 percent, while in the Green Book, a value of 1.5
percent is used for short time horizons. With this data, the discount
rate is equal to rs = ρ + ng =1 .4 percent in the Stern Review, and
rG = ρ+ng =3 .5 percent in the Green Book for short-term projects.
To calculate the intergenerational discount rate, we assume that
world-average life expectancy is 64 years (U.S. Census Bureau Inter-
national Data Base). The result with the Stern Review parameters
for n and g, and a pure preference for the present ρ of 1.5 percent, is
reproduced in Fig. 1, which shows the discount rate over 100 years
on the left, and over 1000 years on the right. Over one year, this
discount rate is almost equal to the short-term discount rate of 2.8
percent. Over the very long-term, this discount rate is equal to the
1.3 percent, i.e. the discounting that arises from consumption growth
only.
Figure 2 show the results with the Green Book parameters, with
a discount rate that decreases from a short-term value of 3.5 percent









































































Figure 2: Intergenerational and Green Book discount rate as a function of
time, from 0 to 100 years on the left and from 0 to 1000 years on the right.
Parameters for the intergenerational discount rate are those of the Green
Book, but assuming no uncertainty on future consumption.
to a long-term value of 2 percent. The ﬁnal value is larger than the
Green Book one because we do not take into account the uncertainty
on future consumption. Taking it into account would lead to a much
lower long-term discount rate.
6 Discussion
This paper proposes a prescriptive discounting scheme that applies
diﬀerent discount rates for various incomes in the lifetime of a unique
individual and for various incomes that aﬀect diﬀerent individuals. It
shows that it is possible to combine the consistency with observed
behaviours and the ethical position that no generation should be
favoured.
This scheme is not “time-consistent” (as deﬁned in Heal, 2005), but
this situation is justiﬁed by the fact that it is not the same persons that
make decision at diﬀerent point in time: some have passed away, some
are born. Diﬀerent individuals can make diﬀerent decision without
consistency issue (see also, Harvey, 1994).
Much can be done to sophisticate this scheme. For instance, it does
not take into account the fact that the welfare derived from an income
depends on the age of the individual. Additionally, we assume here
9that all individuals have the same life duration, and that this duration
is known. Introducing uncertainty about life duration would be an
important improvement. Also, the discount rate decrease depends
here on population evolution. Using population scenarios would bring
an additional sophistication to this scheme.
Most importantly, it has been highlighted by numerous authors
(e.g., Weitzman, 2001; Gollier, 2002) that future consumption is un-
certain, with important consequences on the discount rate. This point
has been disregarded here and needs to be included. Including this
uncertainty would lead to a discount rate that decreases even more
rapidly with time.
This scheme can be expressed in terms of utility and utility dis-
count rate, instead of consumption and consumption discount rate. In
such a framework, the assumption of a given real-consumption growth
rate could be relaxed. This discount scheme would not solve the is-
sues discussed in Heal (2005), however, because it is equivalent over
the very long term to a zero pure preference for the present, and the
discounted sum of positive utility levels diverges.
As a consequence of these limitations, the discount rate proposed
by this article is not supposed to be applied directly. This approach,
however, provides an additional justiﬁcation for the use of a consump-
tion discount rate that decreases with the considered time horizon.
For the climate change issue, it supports the use of low discount rates,
as it has been done in the Stern Review.
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